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The United States and the International Criminal Court:
The Case for "Dexterous Multilateralism"
Eric P. Schwartz*
I. INTRODUCTION
On Sunday, December 31, 2000, the United States signed the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), and thus became one of the 139
nations that met the New Year's Eve, 2000 deadline for signature established in
the Treaty.' David Scheffer, who served as the Clinton Administration's
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, signed on the President's behalf,
after traveling to the United Nations on the Sunday morning at the direction of
the National Security Advisor, Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger.
Scheffer's last major diplomatic mission for the outgoing Administration
came after an eleventh-hour Presidential decision that marked a major shift in
US policy toward the ICC. The President's decision was hailed by Court
proponents, who have long advocated the establishment of a permanent
international judicial tribunal with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. But the decision was also roundly condemned by
conservative commentators and members of Congress, who see the ICC as a
threat to US sovereignty. John Bolton, now Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, writing in the Washington Post, accused the
President of "a stealth approach to eroding our constitutionalism and
undermining the independence and flexibility that our military forces need to
The author is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., and
served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral and
Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council during the Clinton Administration.
The author completed much of the work on this piece as a Public Policy Scholar at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in 2001, and as a Senior Fellow at the
United States Institute of Peace, in 2001-2002. The author would like to thank Professor
Edward Weisband, Diggs Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for
Accountability Studies at the Virginia Polytechnic and State University, for his advice on the
content of this article. The author would also like to thank David Wippman, Professor of
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defend our interests around the world."2 He urged the incoming Administration,
of which he is now a part, to "unsign" the Treaty.
Despite highly charged criticism by ICC opponents, President Clinton's
signature was far from the unequivocal endorsement of the ICC that Court
advocates would have most welcomed. In fact, the President's signature
statement complained about "significant flaws in the Treaty," and indicated that
US concerns should be effectively addressed before the Senate considered
consent to ratification of the Rome Statute.3 Signature offered neither
unqualified support nor unbridled rejection of the Rome Statute. Rather, it
represented an effort to manage effectively legitimate yet conflicting policy
imperatives to reach an equilibrium that best addressed US interests. This effort
at "dexterous multilateralism" is worth examining closely, as it relates to an issue
of growing importance in US foreign policy: the tension between sovereign
prerogatives and deference to multilateral institutions. It is this issue which
increasingly bedevils US policymakers as they consider how to address the war
on terrorism, the situation in Iraq, and related national security challenges.
II. BACKGROUND TO SIGNATURE
In many respects, President Clinton's decision to sign the Rome Statute
grew out of his Administration's forward-leaning approach toward multilateral
engagement on international human rights issues. This included successful
Administration efforts to establish the post of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights; to secure Senate consent to ratification of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; to sign the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and to
negotiate the International Labor Organization Convention on the Worst Forms
of Child Labor, as well as UN protocols against trafficking in persons,
exploitation of children, and use of child soldiers. The Clinton Administration
combined its emphasis on promoting international human rights norms with an
effort to encourage political accountability for human rights abuses-for
example, through active US involvement in the UN Human Rights Commission.
US officials also recognized that the United States could not easily urge upon
others standards of behavior and accountability that the US government was
unprepared to accept for itself, and the Administration spent a great deal of time
and energy in preparing reports on human rights practices in the United States,
which were submitted to UN bodies pursuant to treaties relating to civil and
political rights, torture, and racial discrimination.
2

John R. Bolton, Unsign That Treaty, Wash Post A21 (Jan 4, 2001).

3

Statement by the President, Signature of the International Criminal Court Treatly (Dec 31, 2000),
available online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/00123101.htm> (visited
Mar 30, 2003).
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The Clinton Administration also embraced the concept of international
criminal accountability for massive human rights violations and played a leading
role in efforts to establish the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In the case of the Balkans, in particular, the
Administration viewed the Tribunal not only as a means to ensure justice for
victims of grave abuses, but also as part of an international political effort to
marginalize extremists and thereby encourage regional peace, stability, and
reconciliation.
In 1995, on the strength of this general orientation toward human rights
and accountability, several factors set the stage for a Clinton Administration
commitment in principle to an International Criminal Court. These included
sympathy within the Administration for a permanent structure which might
obviate the need for ad hoc tribunals, and the completion of a draft statute on
an International Criminal Court by the UN's International Law Commission-a
draft that envisioned a "gatekeeper" role for the UN Security Council analogous
inmany ways to the role played by the Security Council in the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda Tribunals.
Senior US officials saw an opportunity to advance the issue at an October
1995 event at the University of Connecticut. It was there that the President was
to inaugurate a research center named for Senator Thomas J. Dodd, who had
been a senior prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. At
the event, the President affirmed the importance of successful prosecution of
war criminals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and noted that the "signal
will come across even more loudly and clearly if nations all around the world
who value freedom and tolerance establish a permanent international court to
prosecute, with the support of the United Nations Security Council, serious
violations of humanitarian law."4
III. INITIAL US POSTURE TOWARD THE ICC
The President's endorsement of a "permanent international court" laid the
groundwork for the next several years of US diplomacy on the ICC. To be sure,
the President's reference to a role for the Security Council reflected a US desire
to make certain that the United States, through its veto power in the Council,
would have the ability to prevent Court action against US officials. But the
reference, and the resulting diplomacy in support of US objectives, reflected a
US desire to ensure that the ICC would not undermine the role of the UN
Security Council in managing global peace and security issues. US officials were
particularly concerned that a Court that was independent of-and therefore not
accountable to-the Security Council risked "shoe-horning" into a judicial
4

William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Universiy of Connecticut in Storrs, 2 Pub Papers 1595, 1597
(Oct 15, 1995).

Spring 2003

ChicagoJournalof InternafionalLaw

framework controversies that are the appropriate province of politics and
diplomacy. American officials thought this problem could play out in a number
of ways.
First, the Administration argued that the absence of a requirement for
Security Council endorsement of ICC action would risk inappropriate, and
possibly dangerous, Court interference in international peace and security issues.
If, for example, the Security Council were involved in sensitive negotiations to
prevent war on the Korean peninsula, it might not be prudent for an institution
not accountable to the Security Council to be filing charges against Kim Jong I1
for massive violations of human rights. Similarly, the Court could run roughshod
over a domestic political consensus that a South African-style truth and
reconciliation model, rather than one focused on criminal accountability and
punishment, would best serve the cause of political reconciliation in a particular
country.
Second, with judges chosen by states parties, US officials feared the Court
could become politicized and seek to target Americans. It is difficult to dismiss
this concern out of hand. After all, the United States has worldwide
responsibilities for international security and maintains more than two-hundred
thousand American troops overseas during peacetime. While friends and allies
welcome this US role, it is in many cases resented by America's adversaries. Why
wouldn't they seek to use the Court to level the playing field-that is, strike out
against the American government through judicial proceedings when other
avenues of attack were unavailable? Proponents of a highly independent Court
claimed that US officials would be protected by the Treaty's incorporation of
complementarioy, or deferral of cases to domestic courts unless it was determined
that the state with jurisdiction was genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate
(and prosecute if warranted).' But this did not quell official US concerns, as the
complementarity provision under discussion (and ultimately adopted) left to
judges of the Court the final decision on the adequacy of domestic judicial
institutions.
It is also worth noting that for many opponents of a highly independent
ICC, the integrity of Court judges was not necessarily the key issue. Rather, it
was that an ICC not subservient to the UN Security Council would be
insufficiently accountable to US political, legislative, and judicial processes. This
concern was heightened by the existence of differing perspectives internationally
regarding the specific requirements of international humanitarian law. In short,
there could well be situations where the US interpreted the law to permit actions
that other states (and ICC prosecutors and judges) believed to be prohibited.
See Rome Statute at art 17 (cited in note 1) ("A case is inadmissible where: ... (a) The case is
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.").
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Finally, US officials expressed concerns regarding the impact of an
independent ICC on the willingness of capable states to engage in international
humanitarian actions. They argued that, in the absence of Security Council
supervision, the United States and other militarily capable states might be
deterred from deploying militaries to save lives if they feared that their soldiers
might be put before the ICC for alleged human rights violations in the conduct
of a humanitarian rescue operation.
In essence, advocates of a strong and independent Court not directly
accountable to the UN Security Council argued that the United States had it
backwards. The problem was not that a strong Court would seek to impose law
where politics and diplomacy should govern. Rather, an ICC whose actions
could be vetoed by the most powerful states in the international system (that is,
the permanent members of the Security Council) would ensure the imposition of
politics where law ought to prevail, and thereby sustain the prerogative of the
United States and others to disregard human rights norms when compliance
proved inconvenient. They argued that an international judicial institution of this
nature needed to be accountable to a much broader constituency than the fifteen
members of the Security Council.
Advocates of a more independent Court also noted that international law
already sanctions trials of foreign nationals by sovereign states for crimes
committed in their territories, and that governments ratifying an ICC Treaty
would only be transferring that prerogative to an international institution. Thus,
US concerns about the limited accountability of this institution to the US
political and legal process were overblown. Finally, proponents of a strong Court
contended that US fears of politicization were also exaggerated; the institution
itself would be properly accountable to the states parties to the Treaty, which
would choose judges and a prosecutor and otherwise influence the Court's
growth and development.
In sum, the debate on the ICC reflects sharply divergent views about the
constituencies to which an International Criminal Court should be accountable.
This should not be surprising, as the two sides of the debate have widely
differing beliefs about the nature of sovereign prerogatives, the role of existing
international institutions designed to maintain international peace and security,
and the potential integrity and capacity of new structures. The dilemma, of
course, is that the position of each side is defensible. The risks that each has
identified are real, and it is only in the practical evolution of the Court that we
will discover how these issues will be managed.
But the fact remains that the US position on a gatekeeper role for the
Security Council did not prevail. Instead, the US is left with a Rome Statute that
will, in specified circumstances, enable the ICC to assert jurisdiction over US
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citizens for alleged acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.'
Moreover, the US refusal to ratify will not insulate Americans from the Court's
claims of jurisdiction, though any such claims will be subject to the provisions of
complementarity previously described. The US is also left with a Treaty that
came into force with its sixtieth ratification in 2002 and is expected to begin
operations in earnest this year.
So how should the United States manage this situation?

IV. DEXTEROUS MULTILATERALISM
It was in the context of this dilemma that President Clinton faced the
decision on signature in late 2000. By December, it had become clear that US
diplomatic efforts to obtain significant additional protections-efforts which
had continued even after adoption of the Rome Statute-would not succeed. At
the same time, the President had reviewed material describing the impending
December 31 deadline for signature and asked National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger about its status. As the principal White House Advisor on the ICC, I was
tasked with drafting a response, and I concluded that the President's inquiry
demanded more than a simple reiteration of US policy against the Rome Statute.
In a memorandum to Berger, prepared in conjunction with other offices at the
National Security Council ("NSC"), I recommended that NSC staff develop an
options paper, laying out the cases for and against signature. Berger endorsed
the exercise and ultimately sent a memorandum to the President presenting both
sides of the issue, and reflecting a strong divergence of views not only within the
NSC staff, but among Administration agencies.
It is worth noting that Berger insisted that the case against signature be
made as robustly as possible; in fact, he returned an early memorandum I
drafted and instructed me to strengthen the arguments behind the "no" option. I
did not believe he was seeking to stack the deck against signature. Rather, I was
convinced he believed the President was inclined toward signature and wanted
the President to be well aware of the downsides before taking such action.
Berger's posture was in keeping with his integrity, his excellent political instincts,
and his loyalty to the President.
The case against signature was straightforward. In essence, signing could
undermine US opposition to key elements of the Rome Statute by sending the
confusing message that the US now endorsed a Treaty that it had opposed

6

The Rome Statute would permit the Court to assert jurisdiction over US citizens if the
alleged crimes were committed in the territory of a state that was a party to the Treaty or in a
state that accepted the Court's jurisdiction. In addition, US citizens could in theory be
prosecuted as a result of UN Security Council referral of a situation to the ICC, although the
US veto in the Council would enable the US Government to prevent such a referral. See
Rome Statute at arts 12-13 (cited in note 1).
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strongly only two years before, and accepted provisions that the Administration
continued to believe conflicted with US interests. Moreover, signing might not
even serve the ultimate objectives of Court proponents, as it could enhance
momentum for efforts in the Congress and the incoming Administration to take
action against the Treaty.
The argument for signing was more complicated. Of course, signing would
send a powerful signal of United States support for the principle of international
accountability for massive abuses of human rights. From the time of the
Nuremberg Tribunal to the formation of the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the United States has been at the
forefront of efforts to ensure such accountability. And, like it or not, the ICC
had become the most likely inheritor of the Nuremberg legacy. Signing also sent
a signal to other governments of US engagement with the ICC, which might
help to persuade them to consider seriously US concerns.
But could the United States sign and sustain its opposition to key elements
of the Treaty? Administration legal experts agreed that the US government could
do so: that signature would not prevent the United States from conditioning
ratification on the satisfaction of its concerns (especially if those concerns could
be addressed without altering the text of the Rome Statute-that is, in
documents that supplemented the Treaty); and that signing would not preclude
the government from rejecting Court efforts to assert jurisdiction over US
officials.
As the end of the year approached, the issue was briefed to the President
and, on Saturday night, December 30, the National Security Advisor informed
me that the President had decided to sign. The President's statement upon
signature expressed support for the principle of accountability, but also
emphasized that the Administration retained its serious concerns about
jurisdictional issues in the Rome Statute. In particular, the statement emphasized
US opposition to the Court's assertion of jurisdiction over the nationals of
nonparty states, with the President asserting that he would not submit the Treaty
to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, nor recommend that his
successor do so, "until our fundamental concerns are satisfied."' Nonetheless,
the statement argued that "signature is the right action to take at this point," as it
would put the United States "in a position to influence the evolution of the
Court."8

7
8

Statement by the President (cited in note 3).
Id.
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V. ASSESSING THE CASE FOR SIGNATURE

While US signature was far from an unequivocal endorsement of the Rome
Statute of the ICC, it did indeed suggest a willingness to be a "good neighbor"
to the Court, and to avoid attacks on the institution as the United States sought
to encourage modifications to address US concerns. Signing also implied a
willingness to consider the functioning of the Court over time, and to be
prepared to adjust US approaches accordingly.
Noting that the United States retained its fundamental concerns about the
Court, critics of signature question why this good neighbor approach was more
appropriate than one designed to thwart the functioning of the Court. They
argue that the United States could have diminished the Treaty's power and
influence by refusing to sign it, even while recognizing the inevitability of the
Treaty coming into force.
A good neighbor approach makes more sense for both tactical and
philosophical reasons. On the tactical level, the United States has increasingly
found itself outnumbered in multilateral treaty negotiations, where the principle
of one nation, one vote often prevails. When confronted with the reality that a
preferred US position does not command majority support, US officials must
decide whether to remain engaged and offer (or accept) compromises that are
far from ideal, or whether to stick to their guns, walk away from a process that
the United States cannot dictate, and risk an outcome that is worse than
compromises that could have been achieved.
The correct choice is not always self-evident. As a general matter, treaty
provisions are not binding upon nonparties. Thus, rejecting a compromise about
which US officials are not enthusiastic-even if it assures that other countries
adopt a treaty that is unacceptable to the United States-is an option. But it can
be an option with serious costs.
In some cases, the obligations agreed upon by others and formalized in a
treaty to which the US is not party will, at a minimum, negatively impact US
diplomacy and, in the more extreme cases, have implications for US freedom of
action on important peace and security issues. Such was the case with the
Ottawa process leading to the Convention on the Prohibition of Landmines.
While the United States is not bound by the Ottawa Treaty provisions, many of
its allies are, raising complicated questions about US use and deployment of
landmines in combined operations.
In other cases, obligations agreed upon by others will inform the
development of general international norms affecting US equities. That was
certainly true with the Landmines Convention. It was also the case in
negotiations on rules relating to the Rome Statute of the ICC, where, for
example, Pentagon officials played a central role in establishing the definitions of
crimes. But to play this sort of a role, the United States must remain engaged.
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The experiences of the Clinton Administration in two negotiations
involving human rights issues provide contrasting models of US engagement,
and offer valuable insights into how the US might position itself on issues of this
kind.
The first negotiation involved the ICC itself and, in particular, the US
posture prior to the international conference that resulted in the Rome Statute in
1998. As indicated above, US support at the time for a "gatekeeper" role for the
UN Security Council reflected an Administration consensus that the United
States should not permit its nationals to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
Court without some prior act of US consent. As we now well know, that
position ran up against substantial sentiment among negotiating parties in favor
of more expansive jurisdiction for the Court.
But before the final Rome negotiations began in earnest, US and foreign
diplomats suggested that a deal was possible: in return for accepting ICC
jurisdiction over the nationals of states that ratified the Treaty, the United States
could secure protection from prosecution for officials from nonratifying states.
Although this outcome would have ensured that the United States would not be
an early ratifier of the Rome Statute, proponents of the deal, including senior
officials in the Department of State, argued that nonaccession was worth the
benefits of the protection accorded US officials and continued US engagement
in the ICC process.'
However, the Administration could not reach an early consensus on
whether to offer such a compromise. Thus, until the very end of the Rome
Conference, the Administration insisted that Treaty parties-that is,
governments that chose to ratify-be entitled to limit the ICC's jurisdiction over
their nationals through broad opt-out provisions in the Statute.
Proponents of this tougher US position, led by senior defense and military
officials, argued that the Clinton Administration should not agree to a Treaty
that it could not ratify in due course, and that, through more vigorous
diplomatic efforts, the United States could achieve the more ambitious
negotiating objective. Frankly, proponents of the tougher line may also have
been concerned that, after accepting a compromise and obtaining an agreed text,
the Clinton Administration or a successor might be tempted to seek ratification
even if it meant ICC jurisdiction over US officials. In any event, the divergence
of views within the government was not resolved prior to the Rome Conference,
and the outcome was a Treaty which asserts Court jurisdiction over nationals of
both parties and nonparties.

9

Had such a provision been included in the Rome Statute, it would not have necessarily
barred all ICC action against officials of nonratifying states. This is because Security Council
resolutions could have established jurisdiction over officials of nonratifying states in specific
cases.
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The irony of this situation is that the deal that the Administration might
have achieved, but did not seek, in Rome quickly became the fix that the US
sought in the post-Treaty negotiations. Some may question whether the
Administration, even in Rome, could have achieved the compromise
arrangement.'0 But there is no question that whatever opportunity there had
been to do so had long passed once the Rome Statute had been adopted.
This diplomatic outcome contrasts with the result of a second negotiation,
which ended in 2000 and involved a draft Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict." For
several years prior to 2000, there had been broad international consensus that
the Convention's minimum age for recruitment into the armed forces and
participation in hostilities-set at fifteen years of age-should be raised. Many
US negotiating counterparts were urging the Administration to accept an
eighteen-year-old minimum for both recruitment and participation in hostilities.
The US position had long been that seventeen-year-olds, with permission of
their parents, should be permitted to enter the armed forces and to participate in
hostilities. The Administration believed, with great merit, that the real issue was
not seventeen versus eighteen, but rather the question of much younger children
conscripted into combat in many parts of the developing world. US Defense
Department officials contended that US military readiness requirements, and the
need to tap into the nationwide pool of potential candidates in high school,
made it essential that the United States be able to recruit seventeen-year-olds.
Moreover, US military leaders were hardly eager to place restrictions on the
deployment of seventeen-year-olds once they were recruited.
In negotiations that took place during much of the 1990s, the US stood
firm on a seventeen-year-old floor for both recruitment and participation in
hostilities. However, it became apparent in 1999 that US unwillingness to bend
on this across-the-board position could diminish incentives for compromise
among US negotiating counterparts, and risk the hardening of a consensus
among many other governments on behalf of an eighteen-year-old minimum for
both recruitment and participation in hostilities.
Thus, with the ICC and Landmines experiences fresh in the minds of
civilian and military leaders at the Pentagon, officials began to consider carefully
what might be an acceptable, if not an ideal, arrangement. Upon review, the
Department of Defense ("DOD") determined that taking "all feasible measures"
to withhold seventeen-year-olds from "direct participation" in hostilities would
not have a discernible impact on readiness or on other national security interests.
10
11

Of course, many would argue that such a compromise would have rendered the Treaty fatally
flawed.
See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, General Assembly Res No 54/263, UN Doc No A/Res/54/263
(2000) (hereinafter Child Soldiers Protocol).
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Reversing a longstanding insistence on retaining the existing policy, DOD
officials signaled their willingness to accept an eighteen-year-old standard for
participation in hostilities, a position that the Administration adopted and
presented to US negotiating partners. The US shift on this issue averted
pressures for an eighteen-year-old standard for recruitment, and the result12was a
Protocol that garnered broad support within the international community.
In the Child Soldiers Protocol negotiations, and for the first time in recent
memory, the United States expressed a willingness to change a major US military
practice solely to conform to the requirements of an international human rights
treaty. In so doing, officials diminished the likelihood that future US
administrations would face international pressures to alter US practices with
respect to the recruitment and training of seventeen-year-olds. The action also
made sense in terms of building US goodwill among a range of other
governments and sustaining American engagement in the development of
international human rights law.
US engagement on the Child Soldiers Protocol provides the right model
for thinking about the US posture toward the ICC. Of course, the stakes in the
case of the ICC are higher, and the US is probably without the ability to modify
the text of the Rome Statute. At the same time, the ICC will soon be up and
running in earnest, and the Court, as well as Treaty parties, will consider many
issues impacting US interests. For example, the United States has a critical
interest in influencing decisions on the general role of the UN Security Council
in determining whether a crime of aggression has occurred. Similarly, with the
proliferation of international legal actions against human rights violators in
domestic courts from Chile to Belgium to the United K'ingdom, some have
suggested that the ICC might play a role in rationalizing decisions on difficult
jurisdictional issues. As in the case of aggression, the US government would
have a keen interest in influencing action that the ICC might take in this area.
Also, with the advent of the ICC, the UN Security Council may be unlikely to
adopt ad hoc tribunals for crimes committed after entry into force of the Rome
Statute. Thus, in the context of a Security Council consensus to go after a future
Slobodan Milosevic, the United States would not want to have foreclosed any
possibility of US-ICC cooperation.
Finally, it is important to consider the US posture toward the ICC in terms
of the historic commitment of the United States to international human rights,
the rule of law, and accountability for grave abuses-commitments that hardly
began with the Clinton Administration. In fact, it was not Madeleine Albright,

12

See id at arts 1-4. The Clinton Administration signed, and the Bush Administration
ultimately ratified this important measure. See US Dept of State, Raification of Optional
Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Dec 23, 2002), available online at
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16198.htm> (visited Mar 30, 2003).
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but rather Lawrence Eagleburger, President George H.W. Bush's last Secretary
of State, who arguably set the United States on a course that ultimately fostered
the adoption of the Treaty to establish an International Criminal Court. In
December 1992, at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in
Geneva, Switzerland, the then-Secretary declared that it was "time for the
international community to begin identifying individuals who may have to
answer for having committed crimes against humanity." 3 He also endorsed the
UN process to establish accountability, and urged the incoming Clinton
Administration to carry forward the effort. Eagleburger's tough language was the
logical extension of Bush Administration support, two months earlier, for the
creation of a UN commission of experts to examine evidence of war crimes and
to recommend further appropriate steps to address this issue.
VI. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE WAY AHEAD
As reflected by US efforts to ensure the delivery of Slobodan Milosevic to
the Hague to face prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, the second Bush Administration has sought to use the
concept of international criminal accountability in the Balkans in much the same
way as did the Clinton Administration: to marginalize extremists and thereby
promote the process of democratization. To be sure, it is nowhere ordained that
American support for the principles of universality and international
accountability through an ad hoc international criminal tribunal compels the
United States to embrace the ICC in its current form. But unequivocal
opposition, reflected, for example, in efforts to force other governments to
modify their commitments to the Court, cannot reasonably be reconciled with
the United States' historic posture on the question of human rights and
accountability.
Unfortunately, the Bush Administration's posture toward the ICC has
tended toward this more extreme position. Shortly after formally renouncing US
signature (and any obligations attendant to that act) in May 2002, the
Administration sought Security Council endorsement of an indefinite exemption
from ICC jurisdiction for all US officials engaged in peacekeeping operations
anywhere in the world. Moreover, the US threatened not only to withdraw
official US personnel from all UN operations if the US did not get its way, but
also threatened to veto continuation of a UN law enforcement assistance
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was up for renewal in June 2002. The
overwhelming majority of other governments opposed the US position, and
while US allies sought some sort of compromise, they argued that the Rome
Statute effectively authorized the Security Council to provide only one year, and
13

Lawrence Eagleburger, The Need to Respond to War Gimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 3 US Dept of
State Dispatch 923, 923 (1992).
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not indefinite, exemptions from prosecution.14 Thus, even US friends and allies
were loath to accept a US proposal that would force them to undermine the text
of a Treaty they had only recently ratified. Nonetheless, the Administration held
firm and, on July 1, 2002, vetoed extension of the UN mission in Bosnia. At the
time, Administration critics, including this author, noted that the US is now
depending on the leadership of other governments in peacekeeping missions in
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and East Timor, and argued that US threats of
disengagement sent the wrong message to allies whose support in the war on
terrorism, Iraq, and other issues will be critical in the years ahead." Although the
Administration ultimately changed its approach and accepted a one-year
exemption (which enabled continuation of the Bosnia mission), the
compromise
16
came after much of the diplomatic damage had already been done.
As the Bush Administration confronts additional ICC-related issues in the
months and years to come, a far more prudent course would be to restore the
prior Administration's posture of dexterous multilateralism. In that posture, the
Bush Administration could still emphasize that it is not prepared to support
ratification or endorse Treaty provisions on Court jurisdiction over the nationals
of nonparties. But the Administration could also make it clear that it is keeping
its options open and avoiding actions that would undermine the Court and
imperil a future US relationship with the institution.
In view of Administration statements and actions over the past two years,
it is unrealistic to expect President Bush to embrace the ICC. At the same time,
it is not unreasonable to expect the Administration to avoid a self-defeating and
hostile approach toward the Court, which will serve only to antagonize valued
allies and undermine US leadership around the world.

14

15

16

The relevant provision is Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which provides: "No investigation
or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12
months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VI1 of the Charter
of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed
by the Council under the same conditions." Rome Statute at art 16 (cited in note 1).
For the author's views at the time, see Eric Schwartz, The US Assault on World CriminalCourt,
Boston Globe All July 1, 2002).
UNSC Resolution 1422, adopted on July 12, 2002, provides a one year exemption for
"current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome
Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized
operation." Security Council Res No 1422, UN Doc No S/RES/1422 (2002).
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